West Africa Security Review – May 2025 Report

 West Africa Security Review – May 2025 Report

Summary

West Africa’s security environment has deteriorated significantly as of the second quarter of 2025. The Sahel’s entrenchment of jihadist groups, expanding insurgent activity into littoral states, and accelerating geopolitical realignment have created a volatile and fragmented landscape. Compounded by transnational criminal networks, maritime insecurity, and growing cyber vulnerabilities, the region faces multiple, overlapping threats. This assessment outlines core developments, strategic implications, and recommendations for U.S. national security and allied engagement.

Key Findings

1. Jihadist Expansion and Tactical Evolution

• Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) have increased operational tempo across Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
• Littoral states Benin and Togo have recorded unprecedented cross-border attacks, indicating a shift in southern strategic priorities.
• The use of drones, precision strikes, and parallel governance structures by militants reflects heightened sophistication and territorial ambition.

2. Authoritarian Consolidation in the Sahel

• The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising military-led regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, is deepening regional cooperation beyond ECOWAS frameworks.
• AES partnerships with Russia (via Africa Corps deployments) and other non-Western actors signal long-term security realignment.
• Political repression, anti-Western rhetoric, and extrajudicial crackdowns have intensified, effectively freezing prospects of short-term democratic transition.

3. Escalating Humanitarian Emergency

• Over 29 million people require assistance in the Sahel; displacement figures include 5.9 million IDPs and 2.1 million refugees.
• Only 8% of 2025 humanitarian funding needs are met. Critical food, water, and medical shortfalls risk fueling radicalisation, mass migration, and social unrest.

4. Organised Crime & Illicit Trade

• More than 6 tons of cocaine were seized in early 2025, confirming West Africa’s centrality in global trafficking routes.
• Insurgent and criminal groups sustain operations through arms smuggling, illegal mining, vehicle theft, and kidnapping for ransom.
• Revenue from these activities is enabling militant self-sufficiency and corroding local governance.

5. Maritime and Cyber Threat Escalation

• Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea has migrated from traditional hotspots, complicating enforcement and maritime domain awareness.
• Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing is destabilising local economies and reinforcing illicit maritime networks.
• Banks and telecoms are under increasing digital attack, with insider collusion now a critical vulnerability vector.

6. Geopolitical Fractures and Foreign Influence

• Russia’s Africa Corps is displacing French and U.S. forces in AES countries, with long-term security advisory roles.
• China is expanding its presence in the Gulf of Guinea through infrastructure investments and port access agreements.
• Western actors are reconfiguring strategies to focus on littoral stability, maritime security, and counter-influence initiatives.

Strategic Implications

• Counterterrorism Gaps: The AES-ECOWAS rift hampers regional counterinsurgency coordination and intelligence sharing.
• Democratic Backsliding: Military rule is becoming entrenched and normalised, heightening the risk of further unconstitutional power grabs.
• Criminal Empowerment: Weak state capacity and underfunded humanitarian responses increase susceptibility to crime and extremist recruitment.
• Geopolitical Rivalry: Proxy competition between Russia, China, and Western actors risks destabilising already fragile political environments.

Assessment and outlook

Short-Term (3–6 Months):

Expect increased militant activity in littoral states, further crackdowns in AES territories, and intensified competition between Russia and China. Coastal state resilience is a key pressure point for U.S. engagement.

Medium-Term (6–18 Months):

Without meaningful regional integration and restored democratic progress, West Africa risks systemic fragility, proxy militarisation, and enduring humanitarian collapse.

Long-Term (2–5 Years):

The region may bifurcate into authoritarian and democratic blocs, with transnational threats exploiting governance vacuums. U.S. influence will depend on agile policy, sustained investment, and effective regional partnerships.

The detail

The security landscape in West Africa as of May 2025 is characterised by a complex and interconnected set of challenges that continue to undermine stability, threaten state integrity, and generate profound humanitarian suffering. The region is grappling with escalating jihadist insurgencies, persistent political volatility marked by military coups and tenuous democratic transitions, and the severe impacts of climate change, which exacerbate resource competition and displacement.

These core issues are compounded by pervasive transnational organised crime, including narcotics and arms trafficking, and an evolving array of cyber threats that target critical infrastructure and financial systems.

2.1. Prevailing Insecurity: Key Trends and Escalating Threats in May 2025

May 2025 has witnessed a continuation and, in several areas, an intensification of these security threats. Jihadist violence, primarily orchestrated by groups affiliated with al-Qaeda (notably Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen, JNIM) and the Islamic State (Islamic State West Africa Province, ISWAP, and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, ISGS), remains the dominant security concern. The Sahelian states of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger bear the brunt of this violence, with May 2025 seeing large-scale attacks, significant territorial contestation, and high casualty rates among both security forces and civilians.

This instability is not contained within the Sahel; coastal nations, particularly Benin, are experiencing a notable increase in the frequency and lethality of attacks, indicating a strategic expansion by these groups. For instance, JNIM’s operations in Benin during May 2025 demonstrated an alarming capacity to overwhelm security outposts and inflict significant casualties, building on a trend of escalating violence throughout early 2025.

Political instability remains a critical feature of the regional landscape. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, remains governed by military juntas that seized power in recent coups. These regimes have largely delayed or abandoned transitions to democratic rule, resulting in strained relations with regional bodies such as ECOWAS and many international partners. Elsewhere, countries such as Côte d’Ivoire are navigating periods of heightened pre-electoral tension, which carry the risk of political violence and further instability.

The humanitarian crisis across the Sahel has deepened, driven by the relentless conflict, the adverse effects of climate change, and mass displacement. As of early 2025, nearly 29 million people in the Sahel require urgent humanitarian assistance. This crisis is severely underfunded, with only a small fraction of the necessary aid reaching affected populations, exacerbating vulnerabilities and potentially creating conditions for further radicalisation.

Maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea presents another complex challenge. While incidents of piracy in some traditional hotspots like Nigerian waters have seen a reduction, the threat persists and appears to be shifting, with increased activity in other parts of the Gulf and a continued focus on crew kidnappings. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing continues to decimate local economies and food security, particularly impacting coastal communities in nations like Senegal, and is often linked to broader criminal networks. The Gulf also remains a significant corridor for narcotics trafficking, primarily cocaine transiting from Latin America to Europe.

Cyber threats are a growing concern. May 2025 has highlighted the vulnerability of West African nations to sophisticated cyberattacks, including major data breaches affecting telecommunications companies such as MTN and persistent financial cybercrime targeting banking institutions, particularly in Nigeria. These incidents underscore the increasing capabilities of cybercriminals and the pressing need for robust cybersecurity measures throughout the region.

2.2. Convergence of Crises: Interlinked Challenges Across the Region

The security challenges in West Africa are not isolated phenomena; they are deeply interlinked, creating a convergence of crises that amplifies regional instability. Political instability, particularly the wave of military coups seen in the Sahel, has demonstrably created security vacuums. The overthrow of civilian governments often leads to a breakdown in established security partnerships and a disruption of counter-terrorism efforts, which extremist groups are quick to exploit to expand their influence and operations.

The juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, for example, have seen a significant escalation in jihadist activity within their borders following their respective coups and subsequent reorientation of security partnerships.

A critical nexus exists between transnational organised crime and the financing of militant and bandit groups. The lucrative trade in narcotics, particularly cocaine transiting through West Africa, generates substantial revenue that can be channelled to fund the operations of extremist organisations and other armed non-state actors. Similarly, profits from kidnapping for ransom, illicit mining, and arms smuggling contribute to the sustainment of these groups, further entrenching their presence and capacity for violence.

The impact of climate change acts as a threat multiplier across the region. Increasing desertification, variable rainfall, and resource scarcity intensify competition over land and water, fueling conflicts between farmers and herders, as well as other intercommunal tensions. These localised conflicts can create an environment of lawlessness and grievance that armed groups exploit for recruitment and operational expansion. Displacement driven by climate change also adds to the humanitarian burden and can increase the vulnerability of populations to extremist ideologies.

Furthermore, the spillover of Sahelian instability into coastal states is a multifaceted process. It involves not only the direct expansion of jihadist attacks into countries like Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire but also the movement of refugees and internally displaced persons, which can strain resources and social cohesion in host communities. Militant groups are adapting their strategies, seeking to establish logistical corridors and support zones in these coastal regions, indicating a long-term strategic intent beyond mere opportunistic attacks.

The concentration of military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—forming the Alliance of Sahel States (AES)—has become a significant catalyst for regional destabilisation and has triggered profound geopolitical shifts. The process typically begins with military takeovers that lead to suspensions from regional bodies, such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and often result in the curtailment or outright withdrawal of traditional Western security assistance.

This creates a security and diplomatic vacuum, which these new regimes have actively sought to fill by forging new alliances, most notably the AES itself, and by seeking alternative security partners; Russia has emerged as a prominent player. This pivot away from established partners, particularly France, is frequently framed by the junta as a reclamation of sovereignty and a rejection of perceived neo-colonial influences.

However, this realignment carries direct and significant implications for counter-terrorism efforts. As coordination with Western-backed initiatives and intelligence networks weakens, new, often less transparent security arrangements emerge, such as those involving the Russian Africa Corps (formerly the Wagner Group). These arrangements can lead to fragmented and potentially less effective responses to trans-regional jihadist threats and may also exacerbate concerns regarding human rights abuses and accountability. The AES’s collective defence posture and its formal withdrawal from ECOWAS in January 2025 challenge the existing regional security architecture and could inspire similar moves by other states facing instability, potentially further fragmenting continental unity and collective security efforts.

3. Deep Dive: The Sahelian Epicentre of Instability

The Sahel region, particularly Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, remains the epicentre of West Africa’s multifaceted security crisis. In May 2025, these nations continued to experience intense jihadist insurgencies, severe governance challenges under military rule, and complex realignments of their international partnerships, all of which contribute to a deeply unstable environment.

3.1. Burkina Faso: Intensified Jihadist Offensive, Junta Under Pressure, and Shifting Alliances

May 2025 was a particularly violent month in Burkina Faso, marked by a significant escalation in jihadist activity and increasing pressure on the ruling military junta led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) demonstrated an alarming capacity to launch large-scale, coordinated assaults, notably seizing and temporarily holding secondary towns such as Diapaga in the East region and Djibo in the Sahel region. These operations, which targeted both military and civilian infrastructure, resulted in the deaths of hundreds of soldiers, Volunteers for the Defence of the Homeland (VDPs), and civilians, starkly exposing critical weaknesses in the Burkinabe military’s defences.

Attacks on key military installations, such as the camps at Lanfiera (Boucle du Mouhoun region) and Sollé (North region), further underscored the militants’ strength and the vulnerability of state forces. This apparent shift in JNIM’s strategy, moving from hit-and-run attacks to overrunning and holding population centres, even if temporarily, signals a dangerous evolution in the conflict. Adding to the military’s challenges, Katiba Macina, a prominent JNIM subgroup, has reportedly increased its use of drones for attacks, a tactic also observed in Mali.

Internally, Captain Traoré’s junta is facing mounting difficulties. The VDPs, civilian auxiliaries armed by the state, issued an ultimatum in mid-May demanding better military reinforcement and support, threatening to demobilise if their calls were not heeded. This indicates growing discontent even among forces aligned with the junta. In response to the worsening security situation and pockets of dissent, military authorities have intensified pro-Traoré propaganda on social media.

The aftermath of an alleged coup plot in April 2025 continued to cast a shadow, with several soldiers involved reportedly remaining missing. Reflecting the junta’s insecurity, French daily Le Monde reported on May 6 that Captain Traoré had requested Chad to dispatch 200 soldiers to bolster his protection force.

Amidst this turmoil, Burkina Faso has actively pursued new international alliances. Captain Traoré held talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 9 to deepen cooperation, and the Director General of the Iranian Police visited Ouagadougou on May 11 to discuss police cooperation. Furthermore, Burkina Faso’s ambassador to Iran met with his Afghan counterpart in Tehran in May, fueling speculation that the junta might be seeking closer ties with Taliban authorities to explore potential dialogue channels with JNIM. As a member of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES), Burkina Faso has formally withdrawn from ECOWAS and is cultivating closer security and political ties with Russia.

The civilian population continues to bear the brunt of the escalating conflict and the junta’s counterinsurgency strategy. Reports suggest that Traoré’s regime has presided over a period of deliberately increased violence against civilians, with 2025 on track to rival 2024’s grim statistics for civilian fatalities in operations involving state forces. The VDP militias, often poorly trained and operating with minimal oversight, are increasingly implicated in these instances of violence against civilians, potentially exacerbating ethnic tensions and fueling further cycles of conflict.

3.2. Mali: Political Repression, Continued Militancy, and Breakdown of Peace Accords

Mali’s political and security situation remained highly volatile in May 2025. The military junta took a significant step to consolidate its power by dissolving all political parties on May 13. This move triggered widespread outrage and led to mass protests in Bamako, reportedly the largest since the 2021 coup that brought the current leadership to power. The crackdown on political freedoms was further evidenced by the abduction of opposition leaders Abba Alhassane and El Bachir Thiam on May 8, whose whereabouts remained unknown as of late May. These actions signal a hardening of the junta’s stance against dissent and further dim the prospects for a timely transition to civilian rule.

Militant activity continued unabated across much of the country. JNIM launched a major attack on the Dioura military camp in the Mopti region on May 23, occupying it for several hours and reportedly killing 41 soldiers. Allegations of mass killings of civilians by the Malian military also persisted, with residents of Diafarabe accusing soldiers of executing at least 20 Fulani men. JNIM condemned this alleged incident and threatened reprisals, while the army announced an investigation. The group also continued its southward advance, attacking a gold mining site in Narena in the southwest on May 12, killing three civilians. In the north, the separatist Azawad Liberation Front claimed responsibility for a drone attack on military forces and their Russian auxiliaries in Léré on May 9.

Internationally, Mali’s relations with some partners remained strained. The standoff with Canadian mining giant Barrick Gold over its gold mines continued. As a core member of the African Economic Community (AEC), Mali increasingly relies on Russian security support, with the Africa Corps reportedly replacing the Wagner Group in assisting the Malian military. Tensions with neighbouring Algeria persisted following an incident in late March/early April where a Malian drone was shot down near their shared border.

The 2015 Algiers Peace Accord, once seen as a cornerstone for stability in northern Mali, is now effectively defunct. There are no discernible efforts or prospects for its revival, particularly following the complete withdrawal of the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in December 2023. This withdrawal has left a significant security void, which various armed groups, including jihadists and separatists, have sought to exploit.

3.3. Niger: Post-Coup Security Vacuum, Surge in Militant Attacks, and Border Dynamics

Niger’s security situation significantly deteriorated in May 2025, with jihadist groups launching deadly attacks against military forces, exposing critical flaws in the junta’s security strategy. The country, under military rule since the July 2023 coup, is grappling with a security vacuum exacerbated by the withdrawal of former Western partners and its exit from regional security arrangements. Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel) conducted a particularly lethal assault on two military positions in Eknewane town (Tahoua region) on May 25, reportedly killing up to 58 soldiers.

Earlier in the month, on May 4, IS Sahel targeted a military patrol near Dan Kassari village in the Dosso region, resulting in at least 12 soldier fatalities. JNIM also remained active, attacking an army position in Mossipaga village (Tillabery region) on May 15, claiming to have killed seven soldiers and seized equipment. In the Diffa region, bordering Nigeria, an improvised explosive device (IED) likely planted by Boko Haram killed seven civilians and injured 11 on May 8.

A mutiny at the Termit garrison further highlighted the strain on the Nigerien military. Soldiers there protested against poor living conditions, inadequate equipment, and delayed salaries, reportedly detaining the commander of the Zinder military zone and the deputy army chief, demanding a meeting with Defence Minister General Salifou Modi. This incident underscores the challenges to military morale and operational capacity.

On the political front, President General Abdourahamane Tiani appointed 189 members to the Consultative Council of the Refoundation on May 1. This body is intended to serve as an advisory legislative assembly during the junta’s declared five-year transitional period. Niger remains a key member of the AES, alongside Mali and Burkina Faso, and has consequently reoriented its foreign policy, aligning more closely with Russia and distancing itself from ECOWAS and former Western security partners.

Border dynamics remain a significant concern. President Tiani announced on May 31 that Niger’s border with Benin would remain closed for the foreseeable future, citing the alleged presence of “destabilising French troops” on Beninese territory. This closure continues to impact cross-border trade and movement. Concurrently, IS Sahel Province (ISSP) has successfully operationalised its support networks along the western Niger-Nigeria border. This has led to a marked increase in attacks in this area throughout 2025, demonstrating the group’s expanding reach and operational capabilities.

The military juntas in the Sahel, while championing a narrative of reclaimed sovereignty through disengagement from Western partners and regional bodies like ECOWAS, paradoxically deepen their dependence on new external actors and exacerbate internal fragilities. The expulsion of French forces and UN peacekeepers, such as MINUSMA, from Mali, as well as the withdrawal from regional security frameworks like ECOWAS and the G5 Sahel, is presented as a sovereign decision. However, these actions create immediate security vacuums.

To address these issues, the junta have increasingly turned to Russia, relying on entities like the Africa Corps (formerly Wagner Group) for security assistance and exploring partnerships with other non-traditional actors like Iran or, in Burkina Faso’s case, potentially the Taliban for dialogue with militants. These new relationships often come with less transparency and fewer accountability mechanisms than previous arrangements, fostering new forms of dependency.

Moreover, the counterinsurgency strategies adopted under this banner of “sovereignty,” which frequently involve the arming of local civilian auxiliaries (VDPs) and have been linked to increased civilian casualties, are proving counterproductive. Instead of enhancing security, these tactics often fuel local grievances, potentially boost militant recruitment, and fail to stem the tide of violence. Internally, the suppression of political dissent, the dissolution of political parties as seen in Mali, and the indefinite postponement of elections are eroding domestic legitimacy. This increases the risk of further coups, as evidenced by alleged plots in Burkina Faso or wider popular unrest.

Economic pressures, exacerbated by previous sanctions (although some have been lifted by ECOWAS) and reduced Western development aid, further compound these vulnerabilities. Juntas are resorting to resource nationalism, exemplified by Niger’s dispute with a Chinese oil company and Mali’s issues with Barrick Gold. While this may offer short-term political gains, it can deter investment and create an unstable economic environment, making the regimes more reliant on resource extraction deals with their new partners, potentially under less favourable terms that undermine long-term economic sovereignty. The establishment of the AES Confederal Bank for Investment and Development represents an attempt to build economic self-reliance; however, its capacity to address these deep-seated dependencies and fragilities remains to be proven.

2. West Africa Security Landscape – May 2025: An Overview

Table 1: Comparative Overview of Sahelian Juntas (May 2025)

4. Coastal States Under Pressure: Spillover and Indigenous Threats

The instability emanating from the Sahel is increasingly impacting coastal West African states. This is not merely a passive “spillover” but involves active expansion by jihadist groups, exploitation of local vulnerabilities, and the emergence of indigenous threats that sometimes fuse with transnational extremist ideologies. Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Ghana are all grappling with these complex dynamics in May 2025.

4.1. Nigeria: Multifaceted Crises

Nigeria continues to face a complex array of security challenges across multiple fronts, with May 2025 witnessing continued violence from jihadist insurgencies in the northeast, expanding banditry and jihadist influence in the northwest and north-central regions, persistent farmer-herder conflicts, and separatist unrest in the southeast.

In the northeast, Boko Haram and its IS-affiliated splinter, ISWAP, demonstrated a continued resurgence. May 2025 saw these groups launch attacks on army bases in Buni Yadi (Yobe state), Marte, and Kala Balge (Borno state), killing soldiers and numerous civilians in villages like Mallam Karamti.

ISWAP’s ongoing offensive, dubbed the “holocaust of the camps” since late 2024/early 2025, has involved overrunning fortified army bases and displacing civilian communities, some of whom had only recently been resettled by the Borno State government.

Governor Babagana Zulum of Borno State has repeatedly warned about Boko Haram overrunning villages and, in some instances, forcing military outposts to withdraw, describing it as a serious setback. ISWAP has effectively adapted its tactics to Nigeria’s “super camp” strategy, employing nighttime raids, targeting lines of communication between camps, and using diversionary attacks to prevent reinforcements.

The Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), operating in the Lake Chad Basin, has been weakened by Niger’s withdrawal following its coup, which has reduced cross-border coordination against these groups.

The security situation in Northwest and North-Central Nigeria is increasingly alarming due to the expanding influence of armed bandit gangs and their growing links with jihadist groups. Throughout May 2025, armed groups continued their campaigns of attacks and abductions for ransom in states like Katsina, Zamfara, and Kebbi. A particularly concerning development is the infiltration of “Lakurawa” fighters, an ISIS-Sahel-affiliated group, into Sokoto and Kebbi states from neighbouring Niger and Mali. These militants are reportedly imposing harsh forms of governance, including taxes, on local communities and have been attributed with at least 13 attacks in Nigeria in 2025 alone.

In May, the Lakurawa elements were responsible for killing hunters and vigilantes in Sokoto. Separately, another Boko Haram-linked splinter group known as Darul Salam (also referred to as “Mahmuda”) has re-emerged in north-central states like Kwara and Niger. In April 2025, this group attacked villages in Kwara State, killing 15 people, seizing control of territory, and imposing taxes and their interpretation of Sharia law. These events signify a dangerous fusion of large-scale criminal banditry with established jihadist ideologies and operational methods, posing a complex and evolving threat.

Farmer-herder violence also saw a deadly escalation in May 2025, particularly in Benue, Plateau, and Taraba states, where over 150 people were killed. These attacks often involve assailants, frequently described as armed herders, storming villages at night, firing indiscriminately on residents, and burning homes. This long-running conflict, fueled by disputes over land and resources, often carries ethnic and religious undertones and has resulted in thousands of deaths and widespread displacement over the years.

In the Southeast, separatist violence, primarily attributed to the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and its armed wing, the Eastern Security Network (ESN), flared up in May 2025. Gunmen, suspected to be linked to these groups, killed approximately 30 travellers in Imo state. While Nigerian police officials have claimed that IPOB’s activities have been “severely degraded”, sporadic attacks and a heavy security presence persist in the region.

4.2. Benin & Togo: Escalating Jihadist Incursions, Border Security Challenges, and Counter-Terrorism Responses

Benin and Togo are increasingly on the front line of the southward expansion of Sahelian jihadist groups, with May 2025 highlighting escalating incursions and significant border security challenges.

In Benin, the security situation in its northern regions remained precarious. On May 9, 2025, suspected JNIM fighters attacked a police post in Guilmaro, Atakora department, seizing weapons and freeing prisoners. This incident followed a devastating coordinated attack by JNIM on April 17 against two military positions in the W National Park (Alibori department), which resulted in the deaths of at least 54 Beninese soldiers. This was the deadliest single day for Beninese forces since the insurgency began to affect the country significantly in 2019. Indeed, fatalities from JNIM attacks in Benin in the first few months of 2025 (157 by late April) had already surpassed the total for the entirety of 2024 (103), indicating a sharp increase in the lethality of operations.

JNIM has established an entrenched presence along the Burkina Faso-Benin border, particularly in Burkina Faso’s Tapoa and Kompienga provinces, using these areas as staging grounds for incursions into Beninese territory. The African Union Chairperson strongly condemned the April 17 attack, underscoring the regional concern. Compounding Benin’s security challenges is Niger’s continued closure of its shared border, justified by Niamey due to the alleged presence of “destabilising French troops” in Benin.

Togo also faces a growing threat. In a significant political development, President Faure Gnassingbé was sworn in on May 3 as president of the Council of Ministers, a new role created by controversial constitutional reforms passed in April 2024 that transition the country to a parliamentary system and allow him to retain executive authority without term limits. Opposition parties denounced this as a “constitutional coup” designed to perpetuate his rule. On the security front, JNIM is suspected of carrying out Togo’s first suicide drone attack on a military post in Djignandjoaga (Savanes region) on April 9, 2025.

This incident highlights the increasing sophistication of militant tactics in coastal West Africa, with JNIM expanding its operational repertoire beyond raids and IEDs to include rockets, directed explosive charges, and various drone applications. In response to the evolving threat, Togo extended its state of emergency in the Savanes region for another year in March 2025.

Both Benin and Togo are experiencing what analysts describe as a deliberate and strategic expansion by JNIM, rather than mere “spillover” from the Sahel. Terrorist activity is demonstrably increasing, with JNIM frequently claiming responsibility for attacks. International partners, including U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), are actively supporting these coastal nations in their efforts to prevent further terrorist expansion from the north.

4.3. Côte d’Ivoire: Pre-Electoral Tensions, Counter-Terrorism Operations, and Border Vulnerabilities

Côte d’Ivoire in May 2025 was characterised by rising pre-electoral tensions ahead of the October presidential election, alongside ongoing efforts to bolster its security posture against threats emanating from the Sahel. Opposition supporters held demonstrations to protest the exclusion of prominent figures, notably Tidjane Thiam of the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire (PDCI), from the electoral process and to demand reforms to the electoral system. President Alassane Ouattara publicly called for “peace and stability” amidst these concerns. The political climate had already been charged by the provisional voter list released in March, which excluded former President Laurent Gbagbo and other key opposition figures due to past convictions for criminal offences, leading to accusations of political manoeuvring.

In response to the growing jihadist threat from Mali and Burkina Faso, as well as increasingly tense relations with the Burkinabè junta, the Ivorian government has been actively seeking to strengthen its military capabilities and enhance security cooperation. In late April 2025, government officials held talks with General Michael Langley, the head of U.S. AFRICOM, to discuss expanding military cooperation. On May 9, Côte d’Ivoire signed a military cooperation agreement with Morocco, its second-largest military training partner after France. Earlier in the year, a French newspaper reported in April that Ivorian intelligence services had, in early February, partially dismantled an al-Qaeda-linked network comprising Malian and Burkinabè nationals in southern Côte d’Ivoire.

This network was allegedly seeking to recruit fighters for deployment in the Sahel region. While specific details of a large-scale Ivorian military operation codenamed “Shield” for May 2025 are not available in the provided information (various snippets reference other operations or different contexts ), joint operations like “Operation Comoé” with Burkina Faso in May 2020 were designed to expel extremist elements from border regions like Comoé National Park.

Border security remains a significant concern, given the porous frontiers with Mali and Burkina Faso, countries with a heavy jihadist presence. France, a long-standing security partner, is in the process of reducing its military presence in Côte d’Ivoire from approximately 2,200 to 600 personnel as part of a broader “redeployment” of its military posture in Africa. However, it is not a complete withdrawal.

4.4. Ghana: Proactive Counter-Terrorism Measures and Preparedness for Spillover

Ghana has maintained relative stability compared to its Sahelian neighbours but remains vigilant against the threat of jihadist spillover from Burkina Faso. U.S. AFRICOM has acknowledged that Ghana, alongside other coastal partners, is “fighting fiercely along their northern borders to prevent terrorist expansion”.

While Ghana has not experienced a proven extremist attack to date, national authorities have consistently warned of the potential for armed groups based in Burkina Faso to expand their operations into northern Ghana, mirroring trends seen in Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire. The U.S. military’s Flintlock training exercise, held in March 2023 and involving Ghana, was specifically designed to enhance capabilities in countering jihadist threats.

Ghana also plays a role in contributing to regional security efforts. However, specific details regarding a foiled terror cell in Ghana’s Upper East Region or joint patrols with Burkina Faso for May 2025 were not available in the information provided.

On the cybersecurity front, Ghanaian businesses are facing a significant and growing array of threats. These include increasingly sophisticated ransomware attacks targeting critical infrastructure sectors, such as banking, healthcare, and energy, as well as advanced phishing campaigns. According to the Ghana National Cyber Security Centre, cyberattacks against Ghanaian businesses increased by 43% in 2024 compared to the previous year, with estimated annual losses exceeding GH₵300 million.

The expansion of jihadist influence into coastal West African states is an increasingly complex phenomenon, moving beyond simple “spillover” to a more insidious process of local entrenchment. Militant groups are not merely crossing porous borders; they are actively embedding themselves within local contexts, skillfully exploiting pre-existing vulnerabilities, and, in some cases, merging with or co-opting local criminal enterprises and grievances. This pattern is evident, as initial incursions often target remote border areas and national parks, such as the W National Park in Benin, where state presence is typically weak, providing sanctuary and operational space.

Once a foothold is gained, these groups, predominantly JNIM in the coastal context, leverage local discontent arising from issues such as resource competition, perceived marginalisation, and unresolved farmer-herder conflicts to recruit members and garner support. Their tactics are evolving from basic raids to more complex operations, including the use of drones, as seen in Togo, and concerted efforts to establish “rear support zones” and logistical corridors, as observed in Benin. This indicates a strategic, long-term ambition for sustained presence rather than opportunistic, transient attacks.

In Nigeria’s Northwest and North-Central regions, the distinction between “bandits” and “jihadists” is becoming increasingly blurred. Groups like Lakurawa, which is ISIS-affiliated, and Darul Salam, with links to Boko Haram, are now imposing taxes and their interpretation of Sharia law in areas under their control. This mimicry of the governance tactics employed by established violent extremist organisations (VEOs) suggests a potential ideological alignment or, at the very least, a tactical convergence that amplifies their threat. This complex interplay makes counter-efforts exceptionally challenging.

Security responses that focus narrowly on “terrorism” may fail to address the underlying criminal and economic drivers that sustain these groups. Conversely, traditional anti-crime measures might not effectively counter the ideological appeal or the sophisticated operational methods of jihadist-influenced entities. Coastal states, therefore, require nuanced, multifaceted strategies that address both the external jihadist threat and the internal socio-economic and governance deficits that create fertile ground for the expansion of these threats. Initiatives like the U.S. Global Fragility Act, with its emphasis on integrated diplomatic, development, and security approaches, acknowledge this complexity and aim to build resilience by tackling these root causes.

Table 2: Selected Jihadist Activity in Coastal West Africa (April-May 2025)

5. Thematic Security Challenges Across West Africa

Beyond the geographically focused crises in the Sahel and their spillover into coastal states, several overarching thematic security challenges pervade West Africa. These include persistent maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, the pervasive influence of transnational organised crime, and the rapidly evolving landscape of cyber threats. These issues often intersect with and exacerbate political instability and armed conflict.

5A. Maritime Insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea

The Gulf of Guinea (GoG) continues to be a significant area of concern for maritime security, facing threats from piracy and armed robbery at sea, extensive Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing, and illicit trafficking of narcotics and arms.

Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea

While the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) noted a 35% increase in piracy and armed robbery incidents in the Singapore Strait during Q1 2025, making it temporarily overtake the GoG as the world’s top hotspot, the GoG remains a high-risk zone, particularly for crew kidnappings. A notable incident in May 2025 involved a suspected pirate attack on the MV ORAGE FROST on May 30.

The attack occurred approximately 75 nautical miles northwest of Santo Antonio, São Tomé and Príncipe, which is roughly 420 nautical miles from Southeast Nigeria. The vessel had recently operated between ports in Cameroon, Togo, Ghana, and Benin, highlighting the continued risk across the broader GoG, even if outside specific national exclusive economic zones. April 2025 saw several incidents. In Nigerian waters, the first suspected piracy incident in over three years was reported 104 nautical miles off the coast of Brass.

The Maritime Domain Awareness for Trade – Gulf of Guinea (MDAT-GoG) also reported the boarding of a merchant vessel on April 22, about 104 nautical miles southwest of Brass, by four unauthorised individuals who stole property; the crew remained safe in the citadel. Additionally, armed assailants attacked a passenger boat transiting between Port Harcourt and Bille in Rivers State on April 5, kidnapping five passengers. In Côte d’Ivoire, three vessels reported being boarded by robbers while anchored off Abidjan, and an attempted boarding of a container ship at Abidjan Anchorage occurred on April 8. Liberia also experienced an incident, with the product tanker TORM ALEXANDRA boarded by a suspected robber at Monrovia anchorage on April 14.

These incidents suggest a potential shift in the locations of piracy hotspots. While sustained efforts like Nigeria’s Deep Blue Project appear to have reduced incidents in its immediate waters, criminal activity seems to be displacing to other areas within the GoG, including waters around São Tomé and Príncipe, and at anchorages in Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia. The seas off Ghana and Cameroon also remain areas of concern for vessel operations. Crew kidnapping continues to be a primary tactic employed by pirates in the region, alongside robberies targeting vessels at anchor.

Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing

IUU fishing inflicts severe economic damage on West African coastal states, costing the continent over $11 billion annually. The Gulf of Guinea alone loses nearly $2 billion in revenue due to depleted fish stocks and underreported catches. It is estimated that more than half the fish caught in the region fall into the illegal or unregulated category. Foreign-owned industrial fleets, predominantly from China but also including those from the EU, are major contributors to this problem.

These fleets often operate under local flags through opaque joint venture agreements, thereby bypassing effective enforcement and channelling profits offshore while employing destructive fishing methods, such as bottom trawling. A May 2025 report by the Environmental Justice Foundation (EJF), titled “The Sea Was Sold,” starkly illustrated the devastating impact of industrial overfishing by these foreign fleets in Senegal.

The crisis is crippling local artisanal fisheries, threatening food security, and is identified as a key driver of the dangerous migration of young Senegalese toward Europe, particularly the Canary Islands. While the report detailed the crisis, specific information on Senegalese naval arrests of foreign trawlers in May 2025 was not available in the provided materials. Critically, IUU fishing is not merely an economic or environmental issue; it acts as a force multiplier for broader criminal networks involved in drug smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal transhipment, creating ungoverned spaces at sea. In response, regional and international efforts are underway.

Exercise Obangame Express 2025, hosted in Dakar, Senegal, in May, specifically focused on countering IUUF and associated transnational crimes. The exercise aimed to improve regional enforcement capabilities, legal coordination, and naval interoperability among West African, European, South American nations, and the United States.

Illicit Trafficking (Narcotics, Arms)

The Gulf of Guinea serves as a significant transit zone for various forms of illicit trafficking. It is a well-documented route for narcotics, especially cocaine originating from Latin America and destined for European markets. Arms trafficking also plagues the region, often linked to other illicit maritime activities and fueling inland conflicts and criminality.

Table 3: Major Maritime Security Incidents in the Gulf of Guinea (April-May 2025)

5B. Transnational Organised Crime

Transnational organised crime remains a pervasive threat in West Africa, deeply intertwined with regional instability, corruption, and the financing of armed groups. Drug trafficking, particularly cocaine, stands out as a major challenge, alongside arms proliferation.

Drug Trafficking

West Africa continues to be a critical transit hub for cocaine flowing from Latin America to European markets. While recent conflicts in northern Mali and the 2023 coup in Niger may have disrupted some traditional trans-Sahelian cocaine routes that experienced a resurgence between 2019 and 2023, routes through northern Mali have demonstrated resilience and the ability to restructure operations.

Reports indicate a sharp fall in trafficking volumes through northern Niger. Interestingly, indicators of significant cocaine trafficking in southern Mali are now viewed less as northbound flows and more as reflecting West Africa’s growing role as a re-containment hub, with routes shaped by the export potential of subregional maritime ports. Several major drug seizures in early 2025 underscore the scale of this trafficking: On March 15, 2025, the French Navy, as part of its Operation Corymbe, intercepted a Guyanese-registered fishing vessel off the coast of West Africa, seizing an astonishing 6,386 kg (nearly 6.4 metric tons) of cocaine.

The operation, valued at approximately €371 million, was conducted in international waters based on intelligence from the Maritime Analysis and Operations Centre – Narcotics (MAOC-N), the UK’s National Crime Agency (NCA), and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). In Nigeria, on May 19-20, 2025, the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) recovered drugs valued at approximately N6.5 billion at the Port Harcourt Ports Complex in Onne, Rivers State, and Apapa Seaport in Lagos.

These consignments included over six million opioid pills (Tamol, Tapentadol, Carisoprodol) and 332,000 bottles of codeine-based cough syrup. While this specific seizure did not detail large quantities of cocaine, the NDLEA did conduct a massive public destruction of previously seized drugs in April 2025, which included 123 kg of cocaine among a total of 1.6 million kilograms of various illicit substances. In Senegal, customs authorities announced in mid-March 2025 the interception of three cocaine shipments within five days, with a total estimated value exceeding $50 million.

These included 306.24 kg found in a refrigerated truck near the Malian border, 95 packets from a vehicle originating from a neighbouring country, and 18 kg discovered at Blaise Diagne International Airport near Dakar. This followed earlier significant seizures by the Senegalese Navy in November and December 2023 (nearly 6.7 metric tons) and a 1.1-tonne cocaine seizure in Senegal reported during INTERPOL’s Operation Lionfish Hurricane (April-May 2024). For Benin, while INTERPOL’s Operation Screen (October-November 2024) resulted in the seizure of counterfeit medicines, specific reports of cocaine seizures exceeding 200kg in May 2025 were not found in the provided materials. Guinea-Bissau has long been flagged as a “narco-state” due to its role as a transit point.

However, recent efforts indicate a push to combat this image. A landmark seizure of 2.6 tons of cocaine occurred at Osvaldo Vieira International Airport in Bissau on September 7, 2024. In a significant development, four South American drug traffickers convicted in this seizure were extradited to the United States on April 17, 2025, under a judicial cooperation agreement. The UNODC is actively supporting Guinea-Bissau in implementing its National Operational Plan to combat drugs and crime, and has noted an improvement in community trust in the police in areas like Gabú due to reform efforts. These actions suggest a commitment to tackling entrenched trafficking networks, though the challenge remains immense.

Arms Proliferation and Financing of Militancy

The illicit flow of arms across porous borders continues to fuel conflicts and criminal activities throughout West Africa. The drug trade is a significant source of funding for armed groups operating in the Sahel, enabling them to procure weapons and sustain their campaigns. Additionally, proceeds from other forms of organised crime, such as the trafficking of stolen luxury vehicles from Canada and Europe to West Africa, are known to fund arms smuggling and terror networks. This interconnectedness between various criminal enterprises and armed militancy makes efforts to stabilise the region exceptionally complex.

Table 4: Major Drug Seizures (>200kg Cocaine or high-value equivalent) in West Africa (Q1-Q2 2025)

5C. Evolving Cyber Threats

The digital landscape in West Africa is increasingly becoming a battleground, with cyber threats evolving in sophistication and scale. May 2025 has highlighted vulnerabilities across various sectors, from telecommunications to finance, impacting both corporations and individuals.

Data Breaches and Ransomware Attacks

A significant incident occurred in April 2025, involving the MTN Group data breach. The telecommunications giant confirmed a cybersecurity incident that resulted in unauthorised access to the personal information of some customers across certain markets. While MTN stated its core network, billing systems, and financial services infrastructure remained secure, an unknown third party claimed to have accessed data.

MTN Ghana subsequently confirmed that approximately 5,700 of its customers may have been impacted by this breach. The attackers reportedly made demands (implying a ransom situation), although MTN did not disclose the specifics. The compromised data primarily included names, surnames, and mobile numbers. In response, Ghana’s Data Protection Commission launched an investigation into the incident concerning MTN Ghana customers. Ghana faces a broader challenge from ransomware.

Businesses, especially those in critical infrastructure sectors such as banking, healthcare, energy, and government services, are increasingly targeted by sophisticated ransomware groups employing double-extortion tactics—encrypting data and threatening to publish exfiltrated sensitive information if their demands are not met. Several Ghanaian financial institutions reportedly faced such attacks in late 2024.

While no specific major ransomware attacks were reported as thwarted by the Ghana Cyber Security Authority (CSA) in May 2025, according to the provided information, the CSA did issue an alert in May 2025 regarding a significant rise in financial losses due to online blackmail and sextortion.

Reported losses reached GH₵499,044 between January and April 2025, up from GH₵103,663 in the same period in 2024, indicating an increasingly sophisticated approach by cybercriminals. Globally, cyberattacks on businesses surged by 47% in Q1 2025 compared to Q1 2024, with ransomware attacks increasing by a staggering 126% in the same period. This global trend reflects the heightened threat environment faced by West African nations.

Financial Cybercrime and BEC Scams (Nigeria)

Nigeria, a major economic hub in the region, is grappling with significant financial cybercrime. In May 2025, Nigeria’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) revealed it was assisting six Nigerian banks in recovering billions of Naira stolen by hackers. These hackers reportedly gained access to the banks’ systems with the connivance of insider staff, using devices plugged into the bank systems to enable remote control and fund diversion.

The EFCC stated that over N9 billion had been recovered for one major bank alone. Further illustrating this threat, on May 23, 2025, the EFCC arraigned three bankers and four alleged accomplices on charges related to conspiracy and obtaining N8.5 billion under false pretences in January 2025 through fraudulent alterations of bank data. These incidents occur against a backdrop of rising bank fraud in Nigeria. Data indicates that Nigerian banks lost N52.26 billion to fraud in 2024, a figure that has increased by 196% over the past five years, mirroring the growth of digital payment systems.

Regional Cybersecurity Posture and Response Capabilities

The overall cybersecurity posture in Africa shows vulnerabilities. Kaspersky telemetry revealed a 14% increase in spyware attack detections on businesses in Africa between 2023 and 2024, alongside a 26% rise in password stealer detections. Web threats targeting African companies increased by 1.2% in 2024, and local (on-device) threat detections in organisations rose by 4% (with Nigeria experiencing a 169% surge). A 2025 survey by KnowBe4 AFRICA revealed that while 58% of Africans expressed deep worry about cybercrime (a significant increase from 29% in 2023), there was a troubling decline in privacy awareness.

The percentage of respondents unwilling to share private data decreased from 29% in 2023 to 14% in 2025, and the understanding of strong password practices also declined. The rapid adoption of mobile banking (from 63% to 85% between 2023 and 2025) has expanded the attack surface for cybercriminals. Regional law enforcement efforts are attempting to counter these threats. INTERPOL’s Operation Red Card, conducted from November 2024 to February 2025 across seven African countries, including Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, and Togo, resulted in 306 arrests.

The operation targeted mobile banking fraud, investment scams, and messaging app scams, which had affected over 5,000 victims. The Nigerian police notably arrested 130 individuals, including 113 foreign nationals, who were involved in these schemes. The technological landscape itself presents new challenges. In Nigeria, the cybersecurity field is characterised by a race between AI-powered attacks and AI-driven defence mechanisms.

Furthermore, new technologies like Starlink satellite internet, while offering connectivity benefits, are reportedly being exploited by VEOs such as ISWAP and JNIM in the Sahel for operational coordination and evading detection in areas with poor telecommunications infrastructure. These devices are often smuggled from Nigeria and Libya. To improve regulation, Niger and Chad legalised Starlink in March 2025.

The rapid digitalisation occurring across West Africa is significantly outpacing the development and implementation of robust security preparedness measures, creating a landscape ripe with new vulnerabilities. This digital transformation, characterised by a surge in mobile banking adoption from 63% to 85% between 2023 and 2025, expanded e-commerce, and increased reliance on digital government services, inherently broadens the attack surface available to malicious actors.

Cybercriminal tactics are evolving in parallel, leveraging sophisticated tools like Artificial Intelligence (AI) for more effective phishing campaigns and malware, and employing ransomware-as-a-service models that lower the entry barrier for attackers. The major data breach at MTN and the systemic hacking of Nigerian banks, facilitated by insider help, are stark illustrations of these advanced threats targeting critical sectors.

A critical compounding factor is the human element. Public awareness and cyber hygiene practices are lagging significantly behind technological advancements. For instance, a 2025 survey indicated a decline in the understanding of strong password principles and an increased willingness among the populace to share personal information online, often for minor incentives. This lack of digital literacy constitutes a key vulnerability that cybercriminals readily exploit.

While law enforcement agencies, including Nigeria’s EFCC and international bodies like INTERPOL, through operations such as “Red Card”, are making arrests and recovering some illicitly obtained funds, the sheer scale of financial losses is enormous and continues to grow—Nigerian banks alone lost N52.26 billion to fraud in 2024. This suggests that current responses are largely reactive rather than sufficiently proactive or preventative.

Furthermore, the exploitation of emerging legitimate technologies, such as Starlink satellite internet by VEOs in the Sahel for operational purposes, demonstrates how technological progress can be subverted for illicit activities, adding another layer of complexity to the security environment. This digital vulnerability can intersect dangerously with physical insecurity; for example, if cyber-enabled financial crimes are used to fund terrorism, or if cyberattacks cripple critical infrastructure, thereby exacerbating existing instabilities.

Table 5: Notable Cyber Security Incidents in West Africa (Q1-Q2 2025)

6. Regional and International Responses and Engagements

The complex security challenges confronting West Africa in May 2025 have elicited a range of responses from regional bodies, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, as well as from international actors, including the United States, France, the European Union, Russia, and China. These engagements reflect diverse strategies, shifting alliances, and the increasing interplay of geopolitical interests in the region.

6. A. ECOWAS & African Union

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

ECOWAS marked its 50th anniversary in May 2025, grappling with unprecedented security challenges that test its founding principles of regional integration and stability. The bloc has emphasised the need for inclusive governance and stronger regional solidarity to address issues like unconstitutional changes of government, terrorism, and transnational crime. A significant focus remains on persuading the AES states (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), which formally exited ECOWAS on January 29, 2025, to reconsider their withdrawal from the organisation. ECOWAS had established a six-month transitional period, from January 29 to July 29, 2025, to encourage dialogue and a potential return of these member states. In a proactive step, the ECOWAS Parliament’s Joint Committee, meeting in Banjul in late April/early May 2025, issued strong recommendations.

These included calls to outlaw third-term presidential bids across the region explicitly, revise the bloc’s protocol on democracy and good governance, operationalise the ECOWAS Standby Force, enhance regional intelligence sharing, and, crucially, negotiate new security frameworks with the departed AES states to maintain cooperation on intelligence, patrols, and humanitarian responses.

The ECOWAS Mission in The Gambia (ECOMIG) continues to play a vital role in that nation’s delicate democratic transition and stabilisation efforts. ECOMIG’s mandate includes protecting key state institutions and supporting the ongoing security sector reform process. However, its continued presence has generated some domestic debate regarding national sovereignty, with some Gambians calling for its departure.

ECOWAS leaders approved the establishment of a Special Tribunal for The Gambia in December 2024 to address past human rights violations. A December 2024 decision by ECOWAS to assess the financial implications of maintaining ECOMIG is seen as an opportunity to foster renewed dialogue among Gambian political actors. Specific information regarding a mandate renewal decision for ECOMIG in May 2025 was not found in the available materials.

Casamance conflict in Senegal

Regarding the long-standing Casamance conflict in Senegal, negotiations between the State of Senegal and a faction of the Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC) – specifically the Provisional Committee of the Unified Political and Combat Wings – took place in Bissau on February 21-22, 2025.

These talks, held under the auspices of Guinea-Bissau and facilitated by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HD), saw both parties reaffirm their commitment to disarmament, building on a previous commitment made in August 2022 with César Atoute Badiate’s MFDC faction and a May 2023 peace agreement with the Diakaye faction. While these represent positive steps, ECOWAS’s direct mediating role in these specific May 2025 discussions was not explicitly detailed in the provided information.

Despite these efforts, ECOWAS faces substantial challenges. It has been criticised for perceived ineffectiveness in robustly addressing terrorism and the wave of military coups. The withdrawal of the three AES states represents a significant institutional and political blow, diminishing their geographical reach and collective influence.

African Union (AU)

The AU continues to address Sahelian insecurity through various diplomatic and programmatic channels. The AU Peace and Security Council’s (PSC) provisional programme of work for May 2025 included dedicated sessions on critical issues such as food insecurity and conflict in Africa, as well as the pervasive threat of transnational organised crime in the Sahel. And the AU has articulated a policy of maintaining open lines of communication with military regimes in the region, while simultaneously upholding its commitment to democratic principles. In terms of Sahel resilience and development funding, the AU actively championed Africa’s economic priorities at the World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings in April 2025.

Key calls included increased climate finance, comprehensive debt relief, and robust support for the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The Africa Adaptation Acceleration Program (AAAP), co-designed by the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the Global Centre on Adaptation (GCA) and endorsed by the AU, aims to climate-proof $25 billion worth of investments by 2025.

Another initiative, the Climate Action Window (CAW), which operates through the African Development Fund (ADF), is designed to enhance climate resilience and promote green growth in Africa’s most vulnerable countries. The AU also supports the Africa Urban Resilience Programme (AURP), implemented in collaboration with partners such as UNDP and GIZ, to enhance urban resilience against disaster risks.

However, a specific announcement of a “$150 million Sahel community resilience fund” by the AU for 2025 was not found in the provided documentation.

Regarding maritime security, the AU Combined Maritime Task Force (CMTF) for the Gulf of Guinea has made progress. A PSC meeting on April 23, 2025, acknowledged key milestones achieved since the CMTF’s establishment. It welcomed the proposed flag-off ceremony for the Task Force, scheduled to take place in Lagos, Nigeria, in 2025, and noted Nigeria’s pledge to host the CMTF Headquarters.

The PSC encouraged the AU Commission and international partners to provide the necessary legal and operational support to ensure the full operationalisation of the CMTF in 2025, endorsing it as a standing, ready-to-deploy force for rapid and coordinated regional maritime security responses.

Thirteen countries have reportedly adopted the Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the CMTF. This initiative gained further impetus when UN Secretary-General António Guterres addressed the UN Security Council on May 20, 2025, highlighting the deteriorating state of global maritime security and calling for enhanced international cooperation.

6. B. The Alliance of Sahel States (AES)

The Alliance of Sahel States (AES), comprising Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, continued its efforts to consolidate political, economic, and security cooperation in May 2025, while navigating complex foreign relations.

Consolidation Efforts (May 2025)

In a bid to enhance regional self-sufficiency and integration, energy regulators from the three AES member states met in Bamako to harmonise their policies on energy security and promote renewable energy sources. A significant step toward financial autonomy was the announcement of the creation of the Confederal Bank for Investment and Development (BCID-AES). Cultural integration was also advanced, with the Ministers of Culture validating the official anthem of the AES confederation.

Practical cooperation included a meeting of road authorities to define a common approach to road safety. Furthermore, AES ministers convened to establish a framework for judicial cooperation aimed at addressing transnational challenges such as insecurity, arms proliferation, and money laundering, seeking to improve governance and institutional stability without necessarily unifying their distinct legal systems.

Security Cooperation

The AES is actively working to develop a joint military force, as announced in January 2025, comprising 5,000 personnel tasked with combating Islamist extremist groups across the three member states. This initiative reflects an intent to increase transnational coordination against shared terrorist threats.

Foreign Relations

The AES countries have significantly reoriented their foreign policies, marked by a deepening of ties with Russia. This includes replacing former Western military partners with Russian security assistance, reportedly involving entities like the Wagner Group and its successor, the Africa Corps. Russia was the first nation to recognise the AES and has pledged ongoing security cooperation, including support for the AES joint armed forces initiative. Conversely, relations with ECOWAS remain severed.

The AES formally withdrew from the regional bloc on January 29, 2025, rejecting ECOWAS’s proposed extended transition timeline for their potential return. In a further move underscoring this separation, the AES imposed a 0.5% common customs duty on imports from non-confederation countries, including ECOWAS nations, effective from the end of March 2025. The AES is also actively seeking to diversify its partnerships beyond Russia, engaging with countries like Turkey, China, Iran, and North Korea.

Specific developments include a cooperation agreement signed between Iran and Niger in April 2025, as well as a pledge for new trade and mining cooperation between the Taliban authorities in Afghanistan and Burkina Faso’s ambassador in May 2025. However, relations with all external powers are not without friction. In March 2025, Niger requested senior local officials of China National Petroleum Corp and associated pipeline companies to leave the country due to contract disputes, reflecting the AES’s stated desire to update partnerships across industries and ensure more equitable resource management.

Tensions with Algeria escalated after a Malian drone was reportedly shot down near the Algerian border on March 31, 2025, an act the AES condemned and for which Mali has threatened to file complaints with international bodies, subsequently withdrawing its ambassador to Algeria. There are indications of potential expansion or closer alignment with other regional states. In May 2025, the Chadian Minister of Communications expressed support for Chad potentially joining the AES. Togo also announced its intention to join the AES in March 2025.

6.C. Key International Actors

The security and political landscape of West Africa in May 2025 is significantly influenced by the strategies and engagements of several key international actors, each pursuing distinct interests and employing different approaches.

United States

U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) continues to view the Sahel as the “epicenter of terrorism,” with Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger facing daily crises from thriving ISIS and al-Qaeda affiliated networks. A primary concern is the potential for these groups to gain access to West African coastal areas, which could allow them to finance operations through smuggling and trafficking, thereby increasing threats to both African nations and potentially the U.S. homeland. The U.S. strategy focuses on mitigating threats to its homeland and assisting African partners in addressing the root causes of terrorism and instability.

This involves a “3D” approach (diplomacy, development, and defence), emphasising intelligence sharing, capacity building, and institutional strengthening. Key engagement tools include joint military exercises like African Lion (North Africa), Flintlock (Sahel), and the Obangame Express maritime series in the Gulf of Guinea, all aimed at building partner capacity and interoperability. The U.S. is actively supporting coastal partners such as Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Benin in their efforts to counter terrorist expansion from the Sahel. The withdrawal of U.S. forces from Niger in September 2024 has had tangible consequences.

AFRICOM has observed a measurable rise in the frequency and complexity of attacks by violent extremist organisations (VEOs) not only in Niger but across the broader Sahel region, including Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and Mali. This withdrawal has also resulted in a diminished U.S. ability to closely monitor these terrorist groups, although liaison with partners continues. The Global Fragility Act (GFA) remains a cornerstone of U.S. engagement in vulnerable regions.

Priority countries under the GFA include those in Coastal West Africa (Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Togo). The GFA aims to apply lessons learned from past conflicts by promoting integrated, evidence-based approaches in close collaboration with local partners. Benin has emerged as a key U.S. security partner in this context, with significant engagement through the GFA and the U.S.-German Coastal States Stability Mechanism. As part of this enhanced partnership, the U.S. reportedly spent $4 million to refurbish an airfield in Parakou, Benin (reported in September 2024). A biennial report to Congress on the implementation of the GFA and the U.S. Strategy to Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability (SPCPS) was submitted in early 2025.

France

France is undergoing a significant recalibration of its long-standing military presence in West Africa. Operation Corymbe, its maritime security mission in the Gulf of Guinea, continues with approximately 450 personnel deployed. France also maintains prepositioned forces in Senegal (250 personnel), Côte d’Ivoire (400 personnel), Gabon (250 personnel), and a larger contingent in Djibouti (1,500 personnel). However, there is a notable reduction of forces in Côte d’Ivoire, from around 2,200 to 600, as part of a broader “redeployment” of its military posture rather than a complete disengagement.

The withdrawal of French forces from the AES countries (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) is largely complete, and French troops also finalised their Chad pullout by the end of January 2025. Despite these drawdowns, France continues to support its African partners in the Gulf of Guinea through cooperation on maritime situational awareness, joint security activities, and efforts to combat illicit naval activities, often within the framework of the Yaoundé Architecture for Maritime Safety and Security.

France also contributes to the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presence in the Gulf of Guinea. Bilateral military activities continued in May 2025. The French and Ivorian armies conducted a joint air operations exercise (DLIA-I) from April 28 to May 14. The French multi-mission frigate (FREMM) Normandie participated in the NATO exercise Formidable Shield 25 from May 4 to 23. And the French presence, even where reduced, can still be a point of contention. Niger, for instance, cited the alleged presence of “destabilising French troops” in Benin as a reason for maintaining its border closure with that country.

In Benin, a trade union had planned a demonstration to demand the withdrawal of French military forces, which were perceived by some as exacerbating the terrorist threat; however, the demonstration was ultimately banned.

The European Union

The EU employs a multifaceted approach to security in Africa, emphasising counter-terrorism partnerships, development aid, and support for security sector reform. The SPHINX initiative is a key example of its counter-terrorism efforts, designed to foster trust and enhance cooperation among intelligence officers, prosecutors, and investigators from African partner countries. It focuses on the “judicialisation of intelligence” (turning intelligence into court-ready evidence) and promoting long-term prevention strategies grounded in EU values such as the rule of law, fundamental rights, and due process, while respecting local contexts and perspectives. The EU also co-chairs the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum (GCTF) with Egypt, with Africa remaining its geographical priority.

The EU is a leading humanitarian donor in Africa, providing substantial financial support for security. Over the past three years (as of early 2025), the EU allocated more than €1 billion through the European Peace Facility to assist the African Union and various African countries in equipping their security forces. Additionally, it has invested over €600 million annually in nationally owned programmes aimed at strengthening security forces, preventing radicalisation, and addressing the root causes of terrorism and violent extremism. EU training missions in Somalia and Mozambique, as well as targeted support to West African countries to counter terrorist spillover from the Sahel, are part of this engagement.

Russia

Russia is significantly expanding its influence in West Africa, particularly in the Sahel, capitalising on the perceived decline of U.S. and French presence and the desire of some junta-led states for alternative security partners. The foreign ministers of the AES countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger) visited Moscow in early 2025 to formalise strategic relations. Russia was the first country to recognise the AES and has pledged ongoing security cooperation, including support for the AES’s initiative to form a joint armed force.

The Africa Corps, believed to be the successor to the Wagner Group in Africa, is reportedly operational, for instance, in Mali, replacing previous Wagner deployments. While some reports suggest the Africa Corps may not be directly involved in frontline combat, its presence signifies a more formalised Russian state-backed security engagement. Russian private military companies have also been reported in Burkina Faso. Russia’s engagement extends beyond the AES. Chad annulled its defence agreements with France in November 2024, with Russia subsequently pledging to provide an alternative security partnership.

In February 2025, Sudan and Russia revived a stalled 2017 agreement that would have allowed Russia to establish a naval base on Sudan’s Red Sea coast. Reports from April 2025 also indicated that Russia plans to arm West African juntas.

China

China’s engagement in West Africa is primarily driven by economic interests, framed within the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). The FOCAC Beijing Action Plan (2025-2027) outlines ten key programs, covering industrialisation, the expansion of Chinese free trade zones, and police and military cooperation.

China prioritises its Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Development Initiative (GDI), and Global Civilisation Initiative (GCI), aiming to enlist African support for its vision of global norms and practices. Beijing plans to train 1,000 African party officials, 6,000 senior military officers, 500 junior officers, and 1,000 law enforcement officers by 2027. On the security front, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy’s 47th Escort Task Group was set to arrive in the Gulf of Aden in early 2025.

West Africa is likely to feature more prominently in the PLA’s training schedule in 2025, reflecting China’s growing interests in the Gulf of Guinea, a region rich in minerals and host to expansive Chinese fishing operations. Economically, China is involved in major infrastructure projects, such as operating Nigeria’s Lekki Deep Sea Port, and maintains a strong focus on securing access to minerals crucial for clean energy technologies.

However, China’s relations with AES countries are not without complexities. In March 2025, Niger’s junta expelled senior local officials from the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and associated pipeline companies due to contract issues. This action was framed as part of the AES’s broader effort to review and update partnerships across various industries, ensuring more equitable resource management for member states.

The decline of traditional French influence and the assertive rise of new or resurgent actors, such as Russia and China, alongside the continued strategic engagement of the United States and the European Union, are shaping a complex, multipolar security environment in West Africa.

This fragmentation of international engagement presents both challenges and potential opportunities for regional states but also carries significant risks of exacerbating instability if not managed with foresight and coherence. Traditional Western partners are recalibrating their approaches: France is reducing its direct military footprint in certain areas, such as the Sahel and Côte d’Ivoire, while maintaining crucial support in others, notably maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

The United States emphasises partnership, capacity building, and addressing the root causes of conflict through initiatives like the Global Fragility Act. Yet, the new alignments of junta-led states increasingly challenge their influence. The European Union continues to promote value-based cooperation, exemplified by its SPHINX initiative, and remains a significant provider of development and security aid.

In contrast, Russia is aggressively expanding its influence, offering security assistance, often through private military contractors like the Africa Corps, with fewer political conditionalities. This approach appeals to junta in the AES countries seeking regime security and a decisive break from perceived Western neo-colonial influence.

China’s engagement, primarily economic through frameworks like FOCAC, focuses on infrastructure, trade, and resource access, but is increasingly incorporating a security dimension, including PLA training programs and the promotion of its Global Security Initiative. China’s model offers an alternative development pathway, often de-linked from Western governance norms.

West African nations, particularly the AES juntas, are attempting to navigate this intricate environment, sometimes leveraging the competing interests of these external powers. For instance, Niger’s actions toward a Chinese oil company while simultaneously courting Russian security partnerships illustrate this dynamic.

While such manoeuvring can provide short-term leverage, it risks long-term instability if these new partnerships are purely transactional, entrench unaccountable governance, or fail to deliver tangible security improvements. This divergence in international approaches and objectives can critically undermine coordinated responses to trans-regional threats like jihadism and organised crime.

Competing external interests may lead to proxy dynamics, fuel arms proliferation, and weaken the efficacy of multilateral institutions, such as ECOWAS and the African Union, which already struggle to forge consensus and enforce common security policies amidst these powerful geopolitical currents.

Table 6: Overview of Key International Security Engagements in West Africa (May 2025)

7. Humanitarian Impact of Insecurity

The multifaceted security crises across West Africa, particularly in the Sahel, continue to exact a devastating toll on civilian populations. The convergence of escalating conflict, political instability, and climate change has precipitated a profound humanitarian emergency characterised by mass displacement, acute food insecurity, and severely constrained access to basic services, all exacerbated by chronic funding shortfalls for aid operations.

7.1. Displacement Crisis: IDPs and Refugees

As of early 2025, the Sahel region is grappling with an immense displacement crisis. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in its 2025 Humanitarian Needs and Requirements Overview (HNRO), the region hosts approximately 2.1 million refugees and asylum seekers, alongside a staggering 5.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). These figures represent a significant escalation since the beginning of 2024, with the number of refugees and asylum seekers increasing by 6% and the IDP population surging by 20%. Many of these individuals have endured multiple displacements, further compounding their trauma and vulnerability.

The crisis is not confined to the Sahelian heartlands. There is a considerable spillover effect into coastal West African states, which are now hosting an estimated 159,000 refugees and asylum seekers in their northern regions, primarily in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo. Additionally, over 169,000 refugees are registered in southeastern Mauritania, having fled instability in neighbouring Mali. Illustrating the precariousness of refugee situations even outside the immediate Sahelian conflict zones, several Congolese refugees reportedly left the Musenyi site in Rutana province, Burundi, in May 2025 to return to the Democratic Republic of Congo, citing insufficient access to medical care and food aid.

7.2. Food Insecurity and Livelihood Disruption

The scale of humanitarian need is immense. Nearly 29 million people across the Sahel require urgent humanitarian assistance and protection services to survive. Food insecurity is a particularly acute aspect of this crisis. Projections for June to August 2025 indicate that 12.8 million people in the Sahel will face crisis levels of food insecurity or worse. Malnutrition rates are alarming, with an estimated 2.6 million children across the region expected to suffer from severe acute malnutrition in 2025.

The pervasive violence and insecurity have also crippled access to essential services. The closure of over 9,900 schools and 922 health centres due to conflict has deprived millions of children of education and severely limited access to critical healthcare for vulnerable populations. This disruption of basic services not only impacts immediate well-being but also has long-term consequences for human development and societal resilience.

7.3. Challenges to Humanitarian Access and Funding Shortfalls

Humanitarian organisations face enormous challenges in delivering aid in the Sahel. Growing insecurity, direct attacks on aid workers, and logistical constraints imposed by conflict and poor infrastructure severely hamper access to affected populations. Compounding these operational difficulties is a severe and persistent funding shortfall. The 2025 humanitarian appeal for the Sahel (covering Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria) totals US$4.3 billion, aiming to assist 18.4 million of the most vulnerable people. However, as of May 26, 2025, only 8% of the required funds had been received.

This critical lack of resources forces humanitarian agencies to make impossible choices, prioritising limited aid and leaving millions without essential support. In response to this funding crisis, Humanitarian Country Teams have undertaken rigorous reprioritisation exercises, identifying a smaller subset of the most urgent needs: 8.8 million people at a total cost of $1.9 billion, for which full support is urgently requested. The human cost of this insecurity is stark: in the past year alone (leading up to May 2025), over 16,800 people were killed in violent security incidents across the Sahel.

The massive and persistent gap between documented humanitarian needs and the actual funding provided by the international community is not merely a resource problem; it represents a strategic vulnerability that actively worsens the security crisis in the Sahel. With nearly 29 million people requiring urgent aid due to conflict, climate change, and pervasive instability, the fact that only 8% of the 2025 funding requirements were met by late May means that millions are left without essential life-saving assistance, including food, clean water, healthcare, and education.

This unmet need inevitably leads to increased desperation, a severe erosion of community and individual resilience, and the widespread loss of livelihoods. Such conditions can compel people to adopt negative coping mechanisms, including further displacement into often equally precarious situations, or, more dangerously, engagement with armed groups that may offer a semblance of protection, resources, or income.

The widespread closure of over 9,900 schools due to insecurity is creating a “lost generation” of children deprived of education, making them acutely vulnerable to recruitment by extremist groups who can offer structure, purpose, or financial incentives. More broadly, the systemic failure of state authorities and the international community to provide for the basic needs and security of the population can profoundly undermine state legitimacy. T

his creates a vacuum that violent extremist organisations are adept at exploiting, presenting themselves as alternative providers of justice, security, or basic services, thereby gaining influence and attracting recruits. This direct linkage between humanitarian neglect and the sustainment and potential expansion of the security crisis is a critical dynamic.

As Charles Bernimolin, the OCHA Regional Head, explicitly warned, a failure to adequately fund the humanitarian response will “put lives at stake, exacerbate vulnerabilities, erode resilience, and risk the spread of the crises”. The cycle of neglect, therefore, becomes a self-perpetuating driver of instability.

8. Outlook and Strategic Recommendations

8.1. Anticipated Security Trajectories and Emerging Risks

Looking ahead, the security trajectory for West Africa in the remainder of 2025 and beyond appears fraught with continued challenges and emerging risks:

Jihadist Expansion and Sophistication

Militant Islamist groups, particularly JNIM and ISWAP/ISGS, are likely to continue their expansionist drives in both the Sahel and coastal West African states. A key trend to monitor is their increasing operational sophistication, including the more widespread and effective use of drone warfare for reconnaissance and attacks, complex coordinated assaults on security forces and population centres, and efforts to establish more permanent governance structures in areas under their control. The lethality of attacks, especially in newer areas of operation like Benin, is expected to remain high or increase.

Entrenchment of Sahelian Juntas

The military juntas in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger show little sign of relinquishing power or accelerating transitions to democratic rule. Their political entrenchment is likely to deepen, further distancing them from democratic norms and traditional Western partners. This is likely to result in an increased reliance on Russia and other non-traditional partners for security and political support, with potential negative implications for human rights and regional security coordination.

Heightened State Fragility and Internal Conflict

Countries undergoing political transitions, such as Guinea, or those facing contentious pre-electoral periods, like Côte d’Ivoire, will remain at heightened risk of internal conflict, political violence, or further democratic backsliding. Unresolved grievances, ethnic tensions, and competition for resources will continue to fuel localised conflicts, which VEOs may exploit.

Worsening Humanitarian Conditions

Given the chronic underfunding of humanitarian appeals and the anticipated continuation of conflict and climate-related shocks, the humanitarian situation in the Sahel is likely to deteriorate further. This will lead to increased displacement, food insecurity, and potentially higher rates of radicalisation as populations grow more desperate and lose faith in state and international protection mechanisms.

Convergence of Cyber and Physical Insecurity

The exploitation of digital vulnerabilities by VEOs and criminal networks for financing, recruitment, propaganda, and operational coordination is an emerging risk that will likely grow. Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure could also intersect with and exacerbate physical insecurity.

Increased Geopolitical Competition

West Africa is increasingly a theatre for geopolitical competition among external powers (U.S., France, EU, Russia, China). This can lead to fragmented international responses to regional crises, the fueling of proxy dynamics, and a potential undermining of African-led peace and security initiatives if regional actors become pawns in larger power struggles. The cohesion and effectiveness of regional bodies, such as ECOWAS, may continue to be challenged.

8.2. Recommendations for National, Regional, and International Stakeholders

Addressing West Africa’s complex security challenges requires a multi-pronged, coordinated, and sustained effort from all stakeholders. The following recommendations are proposed:

For National Governments in West Africa

Prioritise Governance and Rule of Law

Strengthen democratic institutions, ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law (even in counter-terrorism operations), combat corruption, and promote inclusive political dialogue to address grievances that fuel conflict and extremism. For countries under military rule, credible and time-bound transitions back to constitutional order are paramount.

Enhance Security Sector Effectiveness and Accountability

Invest in well-trained, adequately equipped, and accountable security forces that prioritise civilian protection. Reform of VDPs and other auxiliary forces is needed to ensure they operate within legal frameworks and do not exacerbate intercommunal tensions.

Address the Root Causes of Conflict

Implement comprehensive strategies to tackle the underlying drivers of instability, including poverty, unemployment, marginalisation, resource competition (exacerbated by climate change), and a lack of access to justice and basic services.

Strengthen National Cybersecurity Capabilities

Invest in national cybersecurity infrastructure, develop robust legal frameworks, promote digital literacy, and enhance public-private partnerships to counter growing cyber threats.

For ECOWAS and the African Union

Revitalise Regional Diplomacy and Mediation

ECOWAS must find new ways to engage with the AES countries, moving beyond punitive measures to foster dialogue aimed at reintegration and adherence to regional democratic and security norms. The AU should support these efforts and continue to champion African-led solutions, including maintaining open lines of communication with de facto authorities while upholding core principles.

Operationalise Regional Security Mechanisms

Expedite the full operationalisation of initiatives such as the AU Combined Maritime Task Force for the Gulf of Guinea and the ECOWAS Standby Force, ensuring they are adequately resourced, mandated, and coordinated with national efforts.

Promote Integrated Approaches

Champion holistic strategies that link security interventions with development, humanitarian action, and climate adaptation programs across the region. The AU’s Agenda 2063 and initiatives like the AAAP provide a framework for this.

Enhance Information Sharing and Coordinated Action

Improve intelligence sharing and operational coordination among member states to address transnational threats, including terrorism, organised crime, and piracy.

For International Partners (U.S., EU, UK, France, Russia, China, UN, etc.)

Support African-Led Solutions and Foster Coherent Engagement

Align international support with African priorities and regional frameworks. Avoid actions that exacerbate geopolitical rivalries or undermine regional cohesion. Improve coordination among international actors to ensure complementary, rather than contradictory, efforts.

Provide Sustained and Flexible Funding for Humanitarian and Development Needs

Urgently address the chronic underfunding of humanitarian appeals for the Sahel and West Africa. Provide flexible, multi-year funding that allows for adaptive programming to meet both immediate needs and long-term resilience building.

Invest in Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding

Shift focus from purely reactive security responses to proactive conflict prevention, supporting local peace initiatives, community resilience programs, and inclusive governance reforms. The U.S. Global Fragility Act provides a model for such an integrated approach.

Maintain Principled Engagement on Governance and Human Rights

While pragmatic engagement with all actors is necessary, international partners should consistently advocate for respect for democratic principles, human rights, and international humanitarian law. Support for security should not come at the expense of these values.

Capacity Building for Emerging Threats

Assist West African nations in developing capacities to counter evolving threats, including sophisticated IED networks, drone warfare by non-state actors, and complex cyberattacks. This includes training, equipment, and technical expertise.

Adopting integrated and collaborative approaches will allow stakeholders to begin addressing the deep-rooted and interconnected security challenges facing West Africa, working toward a more stable, secure, and prosperous future for the region.